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THE COMMON LAW OF LEGISLATION
FRANK E. HORACK, JR.tS TATUTE law has an unenviable reputation. The common-law
lawyer has emphasized its unwholesome bulk,' and has alleged
that its capricious and sporadic method2 has infused illegitimate
legal principles into an otherwise symmetrical jurisprudence.'
These attacks have discredited the statute books, and the negative
implication of common law perfection has added disdain for the
entire legislative method. And so commonplace have these asser-
tions become that the temptation is to accept them without analysis.
Analysis and comparison of the legislative and judicial processes,
however, discloses surprising similarity. Indeed, if there is a
common law of cases, there is equally a common law of legislation.
Stare Decisis v. Stare De Statute
The "perfection of human reason" long has been the glory of the
common law. The doctrine of precedents has developed "perfect
reason".4 An authoritative sanctity shrouds every prior decision
of the common law, and when occasion demands, there is always
an arsenal of precedents from which by strictest logic a new
decision may be predicted with unfailing accuracy. Of course,
every lawyer knows that this is not true in practice- that in the
difficult situations precedents usually are equal and judicial choice
" Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
'Stevenson, Excessive Begulation (1928) 62 Am. L. REv. 619; Verner, Is
There Too Much Legislation? (1928) 3 ALA. L. J. 257; Hasty Legislation, 162
TH LAw TImEs, 511 (1926); Multiplicity of Laws, 11 VA. L. RFG. (IN. S.)
687 (1926); Bain of Law, 4 CAN. BAR R. 402 (1926); Jones, A Tyranny of
Laws (1930) 9 TENN. L. REv. 38.
2 "It seems scarcely appropriate to apply the term "law" to that which was
one thing yesterday, another today, and still another tomorrow. It is hard to
realize that what was proper yesterday can be very wrong today and all right
tomorrow." Alter, Presidential Address, 1925 Pa. Bar Asso. 3.
3 Lord Coke once remarked "If I am asked a question of common law, I
should be ashamed if I could not immediately answer it; if I am asked a
question of statute law, I should be ashamed to answer it without referring to
the Statute Book."
4 Gavit, The Superiority of Lawyers (1935) 22 IND. U. ALUM. Q. 403.
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is guided but not restrained by prior decisions. Cardozo tells
us that:
"within the range over which choice moves, the final prin-
ciple of selection for judges, a, for legislators, is one of
fitness to an end. . . Every judge consulting his own
experience must be conscious of times when a free exercise
of will, directed of set purpose to the furtherance of the
common good, determined the form and tendency of a rule
which at that moment took its origin in one creative act."5
The twentieth century has seen s; growing insistence upon the
creative element in judicial decisions.0 Precedent has not been
denied, but its complete authority has been shaken by an insistence
upon the unlogical, practical element in law-creation. There is a
growing recognition that caso law "achieves that certainty and
uncertainty that have been its eternal paradox".!
The function of precedent in judge-made law has been discussed
elaborately; its similar functions in legislation has been ignored.
Nevertheless, legislation, like judge.made law, follows precedent.
Save for formal differences of structure, legislation and adjudica-
tion spring from similar patterns of human conduct.
Habit and the essential caution of the human mind seek the easy
comfort of past decisions and abjures responsibility for new deter-
minations. Consequently, whether the decision involves changing
the color of one's house, the breakfast menu, a judge-made rule of
tort liability, or a statutory amendment, experience will find
friendly reception. But the law of statutory precedents must be
looked for, not in the courts, but in the legislative acts. The search
is, of course, more perilous and the discoveries more difficult, for
legislative assemblies have lost the art of argument and fail to
"explain" their decisions.' Their books have only the decisions,
but behind each decision there will be found a reason.'
5 CADozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 103.
6 See Oliphant, A 1eturm to 'Stare Decisis (1928) 6 Am. L. SCHOOL REv. 215;
Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis (1933) 33 CoL. L. REV. 199; cf. Goodhart,
Precedent in Englislh and Continental Law (1934) 50 L. Q. REv. 40.
7Landis, The Study of Legislation in Low Schools (1931) 39 HARv. GRAD.
MATa. 433, 434.
8 Statutes have suffered from the abandonment of the preamble. Only
recently has the "policy section" reappeared to serve its function. Long ago
Bentham suggested its importance. "My practice, . . . is to give to each
enactment, or intimately connected with it, its own set of reasons . . . .'
3 BEnTHA WoRKS (Bowring Ed.) 323.
0 "Legislators who, having freed themselves from the shackles of authority,
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Statutory precedent grows as case-precedent grows. First, some-
one bolder than the rest marks a new course."0 If the course appears
satisfactory, others follow. Legal science calls this the doctrine of
stare decisis. The legislative process is similar. For example, the
common-law rule prior to legislative change was that the operator
of an automobile owed a duty to an invited guest to exercise due
care to protect the guest from unreasonable danger of injury. A
few states limited the operator's liability to "gross negligence".
When this seemed to provide an undesirable stimulus to hitch-
hiking and to assist collusion between guest and host for the re-
covery of insurance, legislative change was thought to be desirable.
Connecticut adopted a statute relieving the operator from liability
to a guest, except for "wilful or wanton conduct".' Twenty-three
states followed that lead.' Described in juristic language, the
legislatures have followed the rules of precedent. In popular
language, the statute has been copied. The result is the same.
have learnt to soar above the mists of prejudice, know as well how to make
laws for one country as for another: all they need is to be possessed fully of
the facts; to be informed of the local situation, the climate, the bodily con-
stitution, the manners, the legal customs, the religion, of those with whom
they have to deal. These are the data they require; possessed of these data,
all places are alike. If they are more at home in their own country than else-
where, it is only because the requisite stock of facts in the former situation is
already possessed by them without their being obliged to wait the time which,
in a foreign country, it would require to seek them out." 7 BFNTHAU Woas
(Bowring Ed.) 801.
'
0 Sometimes the new course is discovered quite by accident. See the strange
case related: by LEwIs in THE ANATOMY OF SCIENCE 34-37. Not always do
the proponents of a new idea suffer the fate of Mr. Lewis' young man whose
ideas were "so heretical in character that he was tried, condemned, and eaten."
UConn. Pub. Acts (1927) c. 308, p. 404.
"AL. CODE ANN. (Miehie, Supp. 1936) § 1397 (224); COLO. ComnP. STAT.
(Supp. 1932) § 1384, 22; CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, Supp. 1935) Act 5132,
§ 403; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 1628; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 5713; InA o
CODE ANN. (1932) § 48-901, 48-902; ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd 1935)
e. 953/, § 58 a; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 47-1021; KAN. REV. STAT.
ANN. (Supp. 1933) S 80122; KY. STAT. ANN. (Carrol, 1936) § 12-7; Mass.
Acts (1935) c. 459, S 105; MICH. Comp. LAws (1929) § 29; MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. (1935) § 1748.1-4; Neb. Acts (1931) p. 278; N. D. Acts (1931) c. 184,
Omio GEN. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1926-35) § 6308-6; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930)§ 55-1209, 55-1210; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 5908; S. D. ComP. LAws
(1936) c. 147; TEx. VERNoN'& STAT. (1936) Art. 6701b; Utah Acts (1935)




Additional legislation has been adopted by seven states further
to protect society from the dangers of hitch-hiking. In these states
hitch-hiking has been made a crime." The legislative intent is
clear. It is doubtful, of course, whether such regulation will be of
practical utility in reducing hitch-hiking. But this is no objection.
Judicial decision has never been criticized because it fails to stop
litigation. The significant point is that in adopting these statutes
legislatures have followed a system remarkably similar to that of
judicial precedent. It may be objected that the legislature, not
having explained its result, need not feel bound by the statutes of
other states. This is, indeed, true. But the statute tells but half
the story. If the committee reports, the hearings, and the debates,
accompanied every statute, the procedure would be apparent.14
Important present day legislation is no longer of "wild and
sporadic growth". Scientific legislative services have made great
strides, 5 national associations" follow proposed state and federal
legislation, with careful scrutiny, and the conflicting interests
represented in every committee room make it as dangerous for
proponent or committeeman to be unfamiliar with existing legis-
lation as it is for judge or counsel to argue without "authorities".
It may be objected, of course, that so long as statutes are not
applied by analogy in judicial proeedings,' care in legislative
preparation is unimportant. This overlooks two rather significant
possibilities. First, that the history of social control through law
usually follows a pattern which eventually shifts from the unwritten
13 CoNT. GExN. STAT. (1930) § 1687 0; Del. Acts (1931) c. 10, § 113 A, B;
ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 29, § 11; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 2720-28;
Ore. Acts (1931) S 41; Pa. Acts (1931) Act 263, § 1031; Va. Motor Vehicle
Code (1932) Laws 80.
14 See Horaek, In the Name of Legislative Intention (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q.
119, 128 and cases cited.
15 See Leek, The Legislative Reference Bureau in Recent Years (1929) 20
Am. Por,. SOL REv. 832. Arnold, Judicial Councils (1929) 35 W. VA. L. Q. 193.
Witte, A Law Making Laboratory (1930) 3 ST. Gov. 3.
10 The significance of the participation of national organizations in the
legislative process is emphasized by their inclusion in THE BOOK O THE STATES
(1937) published by the Council of State Governments, and the reference in
BEARDSLL, LEGAL BMLIOGRAPHY (1937). Any one conversant with the legis-
lative service bureaus of these associations and their activities before specific
state legislatures will recognize the shift thai; has been made from the insidious
private lobby to the public recognized and responsible national association.
17 See Landis, supra note 7.
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to the written law - and, thus, statutes become the significant legal
materials. 8 Second, that the lawyer's function today is not limited
to litigation. The understanding of administrative action and the
prediction of legislative action are chief responsibilities of many
lawyers. The job is difficult, of course, but it is not impossible.
To achieve a capacity for legislative prediction the lawyer must
organize legislative materials along systems similar to the judicial
digests.
The examination of a single volume of judicial reports discloses
fortuitous, isolated, and unorganized opinions- no orderly system
appears. The further examination of all the reports in a single
state will likewise disclose only a partial number of precedents
necessary for a systematic jurisprudence. No lawyer, however,
has ever thought it necessary to confine his conception of our
common law by jurisdictional limits and a search of all the
authorities, English and Empire, as well as American, is an
accepted technique. If expressions of law are still lacking, the
abridgements, the commentaries and all the juristic writings are
available to synthesize and complete "the law". Indeed, the Ameri-
can Law Institute in "restating" the law assumed the "omni-
brooding presence" of the common law and filled in many gaps by
the use of "legal reasoning and analogy". In short, scores of pos-
sible situations although undecided at least by case law are
rationalized nevertheless into the body of common-law juris-
prudence.
Legislation boiled in a similar caldron produces the same brew.
A single volume of session laws is as heterogeneous as a single
volume of judicial opinions. A collection and arrangement of all
the session laws, in a code, is a distinct improvement over a single
volume of acts but still falls far short of a complete jurisprudence.
It is the premise, however, of the common-law lawyer that in deal-
ing with statutory materials it is not permissible to go further
than the code itself. Only reluctantly will reference be made to
the growth of a statute and its legislative history.
If only the latest expression of judicial opinion were made the
basis of common-law jurisprudence, it too would be fragmentary
and useless. Applying the judicial method to legislative materials,
18 Williston, Written and 'Unwritten Law (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 39. But see
Williston, Change in the Law (1935) 69 U. S. L. Rzv. 237.
1937]
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a continuity of legislative precedence can be established. Reflec-
tion will suggest the probability of this result.
Legislation in a single state shows uniformity and continuity.
The legislation of all the states becomes a consistent jurisprudence.
The construction of a single common-law rule depends, at least
in America, not only upon the precedent of a particular state but
also upon the development of the rule in England and in all of our
states. The development of a legislative common law is entitled to
similar source material. With this material available, continuity
of development and certainty of prediction would be possible
within the usual limits of majority and minority views. 9 To con-
struct such a picture certain exclusions and inclusions of material
are necessary, but these exclusions and inclusions may be made
consistently with standards acceptable to the traditional common
law. The multitude of statutes Which expand the size of our session
laws which change the salaries of public officials, provide for inter-
departmental adjustments, and legalize local governmental action,
are analogous to the orders of nisi prius courts. Our common law
is a common law of appellate tribunals. Legislative common law
need include statutes of a legal character only.
Historically, the development of statutory rule parallels judge-
made rule. Although the caprice of popular majority may shift
legislative personnels, today's majority follows the paths of yester-
day's representatives. Social policy changes slowly. Indeed, an
examination of many existing policies suggests that change is
indeed too infrequent.
The social condemnation of gaming, for example - even in the
face of gambling's widespread and undiminished existence -
speaks from the statute books and frn:na the cases with undiminished
vigor. Prior to the nineteenth century, gambling was prohibited
in most of the colonies." 'From spe.3ific prohibitions, statutes ex-
panded by analogy to cover most of the games of chance played
with cards or dice.2 Modern mechanical gambling machines pre-
1Ot is often surprising with what complacency the common law lawyer
represents majority and minority opinion based upon the views of four or five
states, even though indeed there is no general expression on the subject at all.
If statutes are involved he insists that there are only a few isolated instances
of regulation.
20 See, for example, Mass. Acts (1798) c. 20.
21Kansas Acts (1876) c. 81; N. M. STAT. AxN. (Courtright, 1929) c. 58,
Art. 2, § 201; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § :1738.
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sented a new problem but not a new policy. Regulation kept pace
with invention.' And when public fancy turned to horse racing,2
yacht racing," and animal fighting,25 baseball and football pools,'
there was an equal readiness to condemn such conduct. Although
it hardly can be recommended as desirable legislative draftsman-
ship, case by case statutory expansion has paralleled the judicial
technique of deciding questions as they arise. And even the
amendatory process by which this has been done would be unneces-
sary in many cases if courts themselves would apply the statutes
by analogy in similar casesY
Statutory uniformity, however, does not exclude the possibility
of contra authorities, special rules," and minority views.' Thus,
although the majority ruling prohibits gambling, a minority of
jurisdictions have recently abandoned hope of prohibiting gambling
and have sought to "legalize" it. The course of the minority rule
is so constant and the time of its adoption so apparent that it might
well be predicted that states will shift from the majority position
to the minority when popular opinion against gambling is not
excessive, when there is urgent need for additional state revenue,
and when state income is being tapped by legalized gambling in
22 ARz. CODE (1928) § 4673; N. M. STAT. ANx. (Courtright, 1929) 5 201;
NEv. ComP. LAWs (Hillyer, 1930) § 1020-1.
23 MSs. CODE ANN. (1930) § 971; FLA. CODE (1930) § 7672.
2 MISS. CODE Axm. (1927) c. 20, § 971.
2IowA CODE (1919) § 8826; FLA. CODE (1930) e. 7, Art. 20, § 7672; Mss.
CODE (1927) c. 20, § 971.
26 CONN. CODE (1925) § 628.
27 The doctrine of the equity of the statute has been generally abandoned in
the United States today. See Lloyd, The Equity of A Statute (1909) 58 U.
PA. L. REv. 76; Horack, Statutory Interpretation (1931) 19 KY. L. J. 211.
The former difficulties of statutory extension have been avoided by Florida,
supra note 22, by providing "Whoever stakes, bets, or wagers any money or
other thing of value upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or
power or endurance of man or beast .. . shall be guilty of gambling."
28 See DEL. RED. CODE (1935) c. 100, § 4055 (special provisions against foreign
lotteries); ILi. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38, § 328 (grain
futures); IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) c. 10 § 2313 (bucket shops); ORE.
CODE ANN. (1930) e. 46, § 1119 (marine insurance contracts).
2 NEv. Comp. LAws (1929) § 10201. Legalization of pari-mutual betting on
horse races has become common in several states.
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adjoining states.3" The development of legislative policy follows as
predictable a system as does the judicial opinion.
Declaration of policy alone does not insure the success of the
policy, and it matters not whether the policy is declared in a case
or in a statute. Thus, legislators have taken further steps to
enforce policy by penalties and strictures on persons and places.
Again this secondary policy is consistent but not uniform. Some
states declare that the operation of gaming houses as a business is
more injurious than participation in the game for pleasure ;"1 others
impose equal treatment on all conceraed;32 and still others find that
the kibitzer is entitled to equal punishment with the player.'
Control or prohibition of equipment used in gambling either for
the purpose of gaming or for the warning of the arrival of enforce-
ment officers finds consistent statutory expression.' A more diffi-
cult policy problem arises when the issue is fairly put, should unfair
and fraudulent gambling be punished more severely than gambling
conducted according to orderly laws of chance.35 In other words,
is the cheat injurious or beneficial to the suppression of gambling?
It is arguable that to punish the cheat is to protect the gambling
institution, while to encourage the nefarious discourages those who
play with him. Courts as well as legislatures find difficulty in
making a consistent choice.'
Some legislatures have sought the aid of courts in the enforce-
SlNote the spread of pan-mutual betting statutes from Rhode Island to
Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
St MONT. REV. CoDE ANN. (1935) c. 32, Ji 11159.
32 ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) e. 104, Art. 9, § 4671.
33 Mass. Acts (1869) c. 364, § 1; R. I. CoDE (1923) e. 401, § 28. Some states
make it a special offence if particular persons engage in gambling: public
officers, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1875) c. 21, Sec. 1611; minors, A". CODE
ANN. (1928) § 4240.
34VT. PuB. LAws (1933) § 8696; PA. SiAT. ANN. (Pardon, 1935) § 1447;
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6344; Ala. Acts (1931) 671; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
(1921) § 1936.
35 MONT. REV. CODE ANN. (1935) § 11162; IDAHo CODE ANN. (1932) 0 17-2303.
36 Recovery by cheater permitted: Auxe: v. Llewellyn, 142 Ill. App. 265
(1908); denied: Abbe v. Marr, 14 Cal. 210 (1859); Bledsoe v. Adams, 9 Ky.
451 (1810). Recovery by cheated permitted: Webb v. Fulchire, 25 N. C.
(3 Ired.) 485 (1843); Summers v. Keller, :L52 Mo. App. 626, 133 S.W. 1180
(1914) ; Preston v. Hutchinson, 29 Vt. 144 (1856) ; denied: Whiteside v. Tabb,
3 Tenn (Cooke) 383 (1813); Bannon v. Hennessey, 281 Fed. 193 (1922).
[VOL,. 23
THE COMMON LAW OF LEGISLATION
ment of their policy by permitting the recovery of money lost in
betting through civil suits." Other states have felt the policy against
betting is advanced by denying the loser the opportunity to re-
cover." Psychologically, it seems doubtful whether either policy
has much meaning when the participants understand informally
that recourse to courts is not the gentleman's way. Within the
limits of majority and minority opinion there is consistency and
completeness in legislative jurisprudence. Continuity of legislative
policy is in degree similar to judicial precedent. Courts distinguish
rules, and on occasion, overrule hard cases. Legislatures amend
the law and sometimes repeal it. The standards which guide the
action of each is little more than judgment concerning desirable
social controls.
Stare decisis provides courts and litigants a fair standard for
the prediction of future judicial action; stare de statute enables
legislators, public administrators, and those privately interested in
legislative development to predict within similar degrees of error
the development of statutory rule. It is as Bentham suggested, an
understanding of the mores, prejudices and past experience of a
people that will provide the key for the prediction of statute law.
Legislation develops in an orderly manner. It finds analogy in
prior legislative enactment. Unique is the occasion when com-
pletely new legislation is enacted."0
Mr. Justice v. Mr. Senator
Putting aside the psychological advantages that judicial feathers
provide," judges are alleged to be superior because of the advantage
37 MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, Supp. 1935) Art. 27, § 254; Mass. Acts (1785)
c. 58, § 2.
88 Tennessee permits a creditor of the loser to recover from the winner. See
TENN. CODE. (Will. Shan. & Harlow, 1932) 5 7816; and parents may recover
their children's losses, Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 3009.
39 The Federal Social Security Act is perhaps generally considered the most
unique and unprecedented legislation that we have of recent date. Yet it
patterns after much continental experience and is almost a duplicate of the
act which Jeremy Bentham wrote in 1797. He outlined a plan for old age
security, mothers' aid, children's aid, and unemployment compensation. In
many respects his plan was more comprehensive than our own. He concluded,
however, that the plan would not work. See 8 BENTHAM WORKS (Bowring Ed.
1843) 166, 367, 442.
40 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS or GoVERNimENT (1935).
1937]
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of their professional training. It is said that judges are "safer
guardians" of the law because they are trained in law, serve
apprenticeships as lawyers, and because they develop a cautious
appreciation of the necessities of ce::tainty and continuity. Legis-
lators, it is said, receive no special training, are frequently swept
into office on the tide of political or of economic disaffection and
arrive at their desks without training for or appreciation of their
responsibilities. Again the comparison is only partially accurate.
Judges, like legislators, may ride the tide of political fortunes.
But legislators, unlike judges, are not assured of great power or
influence by their election. The new representative must make his
way. During his first term, he must sit with quiet respect for
those familiar with legislative practice and procedure. The legis-
lative tyro receives training similar to the attorney who practices
before he presides. Minor committee assignments will be his first
term rewards. With a second term, he may receive more important
assignments; but if the seniority rule applies, he must be an "old
wheel horse" before he can expect important chairmanships."'
The difficulty is that we still see legislation emanating from the
oratorical halls and the smoke-filled chambers of state capital hotels.
For the most part, this picture exist;, today, only in the cartoons.
Thus, although formally legislatures are unpredictable, hetero-
geneous collections of untrained representatives, the informal
organization of the legislature makes it a highly trained skillful
machine that can when it wants make an examination of policy
and write a statute with a skill to be envied by any court. 2 Again,
although the forms and symbols differ - the personnels of each
system have the same capacities and incapacities for their func-
tions.43
Judicial Trial v. Legislative Hearing
Notice and hearing and the give an a take of trial procedure long
have been unquestioned virtues of common-law procedure, but they
are not common law monopolies. Legislation follows the same
41Note the rise of southern Democrats lo the chairmanship of important
committees, because of the seniority rule, in spite of their opposition to so-
called New Deal policies.
42 See Wis., The Assembly Manual (1927) p. 279, Joint Rule No. 6; hearings
before the committee of Bank and Currency, 73d Cong. 1st Sess., C. Bee. 84,
56, 97. Part 15.
43 See Caraway, Good and Bad Lobbies, and Bellows, In Defence of Lobbying,
Harper's Mag. (Dee. 1935) p. 96. o
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esoteric path- the essentials of the "trial of a statute" are the
essentials of the judicial system.
Legislation of significance inevitably receives complete committee
consideration. A hearing is held, witnesses subpoenaed and sworn,
evidence presented, policy discussed, and in recent years, an oppor-
tunity for proponent and opponent provided." Inasmuch as the
determination of legislative policy involves much more than a
specific or limited fact inquiry, it is natural that the form of the
hearing will not be identical with a judicial trial; but although the
form differs, the essential purpose of each procedure is the same -
the collection of reliable evidence and a sharp policy judgment
based on the evidence. Indeed, when legislatures consider special
legislation, the committee hearing assumes not only the objectives
of trial procedure but all its forms."
A distinction has frequently been drawn between legislative and
judicial procedure on the basis of the care and thoroughness with
which each system disposes of its business. The legislative process
is frequently attacked because many bills are "rushed through" on
the closing days of legislative sessions, apparently without thought
or consideration. This is not the true picture. If it were, judges
might be criticized because they hand down many opinions on a
single day or enter many orders at a single time. Lawyers under-
stand that the opinions handed down and the orders entered are but-
the final result of careful consideration, thorough conference, and
much debate. The same is true of legislative action. Bills speedily
enacted have run the gamut of committee hearing, administrative
counsel, and have the additional protection that the process has
been duplicated in each house of the legislature. Apparent haste
might delude the unwary observer; but the trained legislator knows
that the committee's time and thought has been expended to perfect
the legislative policy. The legislature holds the committee respon-
sible and accepts its judgment.4
"Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investi-
gation (1926) 40 HAv. L. REv. 153. Seabury, Herwitz & Mulligan, The
Legislative Investigating Committee (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rnv. 1.
45 LANnas, PRiVATE BiTs, 6; Standing Orders Relative to Private Business
of the House of Commons (1928); P. B. R., Eyre and Spottsiwood's London
(1899); Ind. Local Acts (1845-6) c. 18; Il. Acts (1929) p. 124; W. Va. Acts
(2d ,xtr. Sess. 1933) c. 170.
46Wilson pointed out that our government was a "government by the chair-




In many respects the legislative hearing provides greater protec-
tion to the essential interests of society than does the trial. Self-
limitation has made the judge a referee. The legislator understands
that he must bear full responsibility for his decisions, and thus he
is not content with the evidence of interested parties. He must
search out every source which adds to the understanding and the
determination of the question before himY
Committee responsibility usually results in more complete and
competent information than the judicial method of brief and
argument. The appellate tribunal must depend upon a lawyer's
evaluation of a proposed decision. The committee, in addition to
its lawyers, enjoys the counsel of economists, public administrators,
and business men. And hi-party committee representation insures
additional divergent viewpoints. Practical evaluation of proposed
legislation is ever available in the committee room.
Committee procedure follows as orderly a pattern as judicial
procedure. It is true that some oJf the lawyers' safeguards are
missing, but likewise, many out-moded judicial procedures are
avoided.48 Thus, the form and indeed the practice of trial and
hearing are similar in the essentials. This is naturally so; not only
because courts and legislatures trale their origin to the single
governmental body - the Curia Regig,49 but also because the nature
of their work is parallel. Only because lawyers have eulogized the
judicial system and spokesmen for the legislative procedure have
been few, has the idea become common that legislation is ill-con-
sidered and unpredictable. The consistent development of statutory
rules defends the system against accusations of ill-considered and
irrational growth.5
Appeal v. Bview
As evidence of the impossibility of a legislative jurisprudence
jurists have often emphasized the number of legislative acts which
courts have declared unconstitutional. Until recently, it has been
assumed that the court in the exercise of this function represents
47 See note 43, supra.
4 8 See note 44, supra.
40 PrumNETT, A CONCISE HrISTORY Op Tm; COmmON LAW (2d ed. 1936) 122.
5ONote, for example, the development of gambling statutes previously
referred to and the development of the regulation of the railroad rates through
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the growth of state milk statutes, and
state corporation laws.
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in a more substantial way the "liberties of the people". This, of
course, is largely humbug. The unconstitutionality of a statute
means and can mean nothing more than that the court and legis-
lature differ concerning the essential policies of the state. There
is no infallible yardstick5' by which contemporaneous judgment
may be made concerning the validity of one policy as against the
other. Only experimentation, sad and costly mistakes, and the
willingness to reconsider determinations can provide the necessary
standards. Most of the social legislation of the present day-
legislation now unquestioned- such as workmen's compensation,
safety appliance laws, and rate regulation have been declared un-
constitutional at one time or another. Constitutionality is primarily
a question of time and place and not of eternal truth. Argument
against the consistence or continuity of legislative change of judicial
rules is an argument against common law jurisprudence.
The system of judicial review has perhaps had undue emphasis.
Proportionally, declarations of unconstitutionality do not exceed
trial court reversals. Reversals of nisi prius decisions are not con-
sidered evidence of deficiency in the judicial system. Appeal and
review are merely recognitions that neither the legislative nor the
judicial policies are perfect, and that both should be subject to re-
examination. The argument cannot be maintained that because acts
are declared unconstitutional we cannot rely upon legislatures to
develop reliable legal rules based on past experience and useful for
future prediction.
A Comprehensive Jurisprudence
Jurisprudence, in America, today, is a diverse science. Essen-
tially, it is a case-law jurisprudence built around our digest systems,
our annotated reports, and our legal encyclopedias. Some organi-
zation of administrative materials and thought have been attempted
-the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Board
of Tax Appeals, and the rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
have been compiled.5" State corporation laws have been collected
51
"When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged . . . the judicial
branch of government has only one duty; to lay the artiee of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether
the latter squares with the former." (italics ours) Mr. Justice Roberts in united
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 62 (1935).
52 The "lay-lawyer" has little realization of the "separate bodies of law" that
have been developed in governmental departments. It is interesting to note
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and organized. 3 Statutory regulat:ion of family relations has re-
ceived juristic treatment." But no general attempt to explain the
development of law concurrently by legislatures, courts, and ad-
ministrative tribunals has been undertaken. In the special field
of wills, pioneering work has been done by Professor Bordwell.
Indeed, the conclusion can not be eszaped after reading his illumi-
nating articles 5 that many of the "blank spaces" in the law of wills
are well regulated by statutory enactment and that the policy of
the law is so sharply fixed and the requisites for compliance so
exactly outlined that there is neither room nor cause for litigation
or judicial decision.
The statute of wills, like the statutes of frauds and limitation
have been received into the sanctum of lawyers' thinking. Yet, it
is significant that the courts acceptiag these statutes as a part of
the common law have failed to reccgnize the true value of their
statutory development. This omission has resulted not only in the
judicial failure to apply the statutes by analogy but also in a
failure to use the statutory development as a guide in determining
shifting social policy and shifting administrative demands. These
defects are particularly apparent in the judicial use of jurisdic-
tional statutes, shifting equity power from in personam to in rem.a
In the field of public regulation the defects of a separate case-
law and statute-law jurisprudence are particularly apparent.
The regulation of the milk industry, for example, has had an
exceedingly long case and statutory history. Originating in a policy
prohibiting the sale of "diseased, corrupt, and unwholesome
products","7 milk control legislation has struggled as the courts
have struggled for an adequate method of enforcing standards of
that in the development of these working codes for departmental guidance
statute law, administrative ruling, and judicial decision are all given equal
authority and are correlated into a practicaJ and effective system for formu-
lating future policy and predicting future consequences.
53 PAuaxi, Coaro.Aiox MANuAL (1908) ; STxmSoN, 2 Ai. STAT. LAw (1892).
54 VERNiER, AmEaIAN oA Ay LAws (1981).
153Bordwel, The Statute Law of Wills (1928-29) 14 IowA L. REv. 1, 172,
283, 428.
556MD. CoDE (Bagby, 1924) art. 16, §§ 3, 82, 90, 94, 97, 98; Conn. Acts
(loulestone's Laws) (1792-95) 246; N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 978, 979; Coo,
'owers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 Cori. L. REv. 128; HUSTON, ENFRCE-
mrNT or EQUTAnLE DECREES (1915).
57Mass. Acts (1784) c. 50.
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purity and quality."8 Legislation has sought to keep pace with
scientific improvement, and judicial opinion has sought to make
effective the legislative standards, but a genuine ignorance of the
objectives and methods of each system of law has resulted in much
lost motion, in much unsatisfactory enforcement, and often in the
loss of the original objective.59
What appears as constant legislative change has been, in fact,
an orderly development of legislative standards to provide the
courts with effective weapons for the enforcement of policy. Only
with the establishment of the Babcock test and the bacteria count
have standards of law compliance for courts and legislatures found
common ground through the aid of science. How much this process
might have been accelerated by a system of law which would make
judicial opinion ever available to legislators and which would
place the pattern and history of legislative development at the
ready disposal of courts is only conjectural. It is certain, however,
that so long as courts have no immediate access to the legislative
5 In Massachusetts, for example, a host of acts have been adopted but the
consistency of their pattern shows the legislative intent to mark out definite
standards of purity. From 1859 (the first year for which the acts were avail-
able to me) the legislation proceeds as follows: Mass: Laws (1859) e. 206;
(1860) c. 165; (1863) c. 140; (1864) c. 122; (1865) c. 194; (1867) c. 204;
(1868) c. 263; (1869) c. 150; (1872) e. 219; (1880) c. 209; (1882) e. 263;
(1883) c. 263; (1884) c. 289, c. 310; (1885) c. 352; (1886) c. 312; (1889)
c. 326; (1894) e. 425; (1896) c. 398; (1899) c. 169, e. 223; (1900) c. 300;
(1901) c. 202; (1908) c. 643, e. 570; (1909) c. 443, c. 425; (1910) c. 641;
(1912) c. 218; (1913) c. 761; (1917) c. 256, c. 259; (1918) c. 170, e. 257;
(1923) c. 170; (1924) c. 310, c. 122, c. 94; (1925) c. 120, c. 117; (1927)
e. 259; (1929) c. 267, c. 279; (1932) e. 305, c. 158; (1933) c. 338, c. 263,
e. 124; (1934) c. 376. It is obvious that the development of the Massachusetts
pure milk policy cannot be developed in this article; nor can the cases which
fill-in this legislative picture be included, but by a tracing of these statutes,
each building upon the experience of its predecessor, a far more comprehensive
picture of the general policy, and the specific liabilities of dealers and dis-
tributors will be gained than can be obtained from the cases of the same period.
59 See Comm. v. Flannelly, 15 Gray (Mass.) 195 (1860); Comm. v. Smith,
149 Mass. 9 (1889). But generally, the court has been ready to follow the
legislative policy in Massachusetts and litigants have been either ignorant of
the legislative policy or too sanguine concerning its avoidance; see Comm. v.
Kendall, 144 Mass. 357 (1887); Comm. v. Holt, 146 Mass. 38 (1888); Comm.
v. Weatherbee, 153 'Mass. 159 (1891); Comm. v. Vieth, 155 Mass. 442 (1892);
60 See note 57, supra. Horack and Cohen, After the Nebbia Case (1934)
Comm. v. Warren, 160 Mass. 533 (1894).
8 U. of CinN. L. RBv. 219.
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precedents of their own jurisdiction and feel that the statutory
enactments of other states are foreign and unimportant guides to
the development of their own policy, so long will courts fail to
achieve their goal of certainty and continuity.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in advancing the thesis of con-
sistence and order in legislative policy is the inability to make
readily available the course and pattern of legislative precedent.
Today it is little more than a realization of those persons who have
had close contact with the activity of legislatures. Its complete
establishment will depend, as the establishment of case precedent
depended, upon its growing use. Law schools provide the most
effective agency for the advancement of a jurisprudence which
combines in an effective way the inter-related development of case
and statute law. Unfortunately, even at this late date, there is little
appreciation or sympathy for such a. movement. All Gaul is still
divided into three parts - executive, legislative, and judicial.
Legislation as a law school cours.e is considered an intruder.
The infusion of legislative materials into classical substantive
courses, save in the case perhaps of seles, bills and notes, and bank-
ruptcy, is still a myth. The hard work necessary to search through
legislative volumes without the aid of digest or index appears too
much a task for Hercules. And yet, until the host of statutes which
fill in the gaps of ease-law torts and contracts, (to select two courses
for illustration) the law graduate will enter his profession only
partially equipped. The inclusion of isolated statutes, without the
development of their prior legislative precedents, will leave the
student misguided in the significance of legislation. The day is
already at hand, at least in the constitutional field, when the success-
ful practitioner must be as well versed in legislative history as he
is in case precedent. The demands of tomorrow will place on
lawyers the burden of directing the orderly development of legis-
lation, the correlation of administration with that policy, and the
sympathetic review of that policy by the courts. If the lawyer of
tomorrow adequately fulfills this responsibility he must be trained
in a system of jurisprudence that excludes none of its potential
materials. He must be able to synthesize statutes, administrative
rulings, and judicial decisions into a consistent jurisprudence. This
he cannot do until the present diver se materials are assembled.
When this is done, the legal profession will find that legislative
practice has its own system of precedents, and has only needed a
second Stimson to give its precedents articulation. We will dis-
cover belatedly that legislation, too, has its common law.
[VOL. 23
